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Abstract 
This paper addresses the contested issue of the efficacy of targeting interventions 
in developing countries using a newly constructed comprehensive database of 111 
targeted antipoverty interventions in 47 countries. While the median program transfers 25 
percent more to the target group than would be the case with a universal allocation, more 
than a quarter of targeted programs are regressive. Countries with higher income or 
governance measures, and countries with better measures for voice do better at directing 
benefits toward poorer members of the population. Interventions that use means testing, 
geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement are all associated 
with an increased share of benefits going to the bottom two quintiles. Self-selection based 
on consumption, demographic targeting to the elderly, and community bidding show 
limited potential for good targeting. Proxy means testing, community-based selection of 
individuals, and demographic targeting to children show good results on average, but 
with considerable variation. Overall, there is considerable variation in targeting 
performance when we examine experiences with specific program types and specific 
targeting methods. Indeed a Theil decomposition of the variation in outcome shows that 
differences between targeting methods account for only 20 percent of overall variation. 
The remainder is due to differences found within categories. Thus, while these general 
patterns are instructive, differences in implementation are also quite important 
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Over the last two decades there has been an emerging consensus that while 
economic growth is a necessary condition for alleviating poverty within an acceptable 
timeframe, in isolation it is not sufficient (World Bank 1990, 1997, 2000). First, the asset 
base of poor households needs to be built up so that they can participate in the growth 
process. Second, growth needs to be more intensive in the assets held by the poor and the 
sectors in which they predominate. Third, because it takes time for the benefits from such 
a strategy to accrue, short-term public transfers are required to protect and raise the 
consumption of the poorest households. 
Implementation of this agenda for reducing poverty requires methods for reaching 
the poor. This can be accomplished by ￿broad targeting,￿ in the form of spending on 
items that reach a wide swath of society including the poor (for example, universal 
primary education or an extensive network of basic health care), or by ￿narrow 
targeting,￿ where methods that identify the poor more specifically are used to confer 
benefits only to them (for example, transfer programs) (van de Walle 1998). The case for 
the latter form of targeting arises from the existence of a budget constraint (Besley and 
Kanbur 1993).
1 The overall poverty impact of a program depends both on the number of 
poor households covered and the level of benefits they receive. With a fixed poverty 
alleviation budget, the opportunity cost of transfers leaking to nonpoor households is a 
                                                 
1 General discussions of the principles underlying narrow targeting are also found in Atkinson (1995), 
Grosh (1994), van de Walle (1998), and Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002a). 2 
lower impact in terms of poverty reduction, reflecting less coverage of poor households 
and/or lower benefit levels. By targeting transfers to poor households, one can increase 
the amount transferred to them. 
In addition to the debate surrounding the appropriate balance between broadly and 
narrowly targeted interventions, there are sharply divergent views as to how much the 
latter actually benefit the poor. Divergent views on the efficacy of this approach are 
based on differing assessments of three questions: whether better targeting outcomes are 
likely to be achieved, whether such methods are cost effective, and whether the living 
standards of the poor are improved by such targeted interventions. This paper addresses 
the first question.
2 While it would seem that there is a fairly extensive literature on this 
topic, it is largely dominated by descriptions of individual￿sometime idiosyncratic￿
programs. Even comparative analyses tend to cover either a single region (for example, 
Grosh [1994] for Latin America and the Caribbean, Braithwaite, Grootaert, and 
Milanovic [2000] for Eastern Europe and Central Asia), method (Bigman and Fofack 
[2000] on geographic targeting), or intervention (Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, and van 
Domelen [2001] on social funds). This partial coverage frustrates efforts to make broader 
                                                 
2 We stress that this focus does not arise because we consider the second and third questions unimportant. 
Rather, our focus in whether targeted interventions reach the poor is conditioned by three factors. First, if 
targeting is largely ineffective, the answers to the other questions are moot. Second, there are simply not 
enough studies with cost data. As we discuss in the paper, fewer than 20 percent of the interventions in our 
database report information on both targeting performance and the cost of targeting. Moreover, the cost 
data suffer severely from lack of comparability. Third, assessment of impact requires careful attention to 
the counterfactual￿what beneficiaries would have done in the absence of the interventions. Few studies do 
so with any care, the exceptions being Datt and Ravallion (1994), Ravallion and Datt (1995), and Jalan and 
Ravallion (1999).  3 
assessments about the effectiveness of different targeting methods or to draw policy-
relevant lessons. 
We rectify this weakness by drawing on a newly constructed database of 111 
targeted antipoverty interventions drawn from 47 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North 
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and East Asia. We use these data to address three 
questions: 1) What targeting outcomes are observed? 2) Are there systematic differences 
in targeting performance by targeting methods and other factors? 3) What are the 
implications for such systematic differences for the design and implementation of 
targeted interventions? 
We find that the median targeted program is progressive in that it transfers 25 
percent more to the target group than would be the case with a universal (or random) 
allocation. However, for a staggering quarter of the programs outcomes are regressive. 
Countries with higher income or measures of governance, which we take to imply better 
capacity for program implementation, do better at directing benefits toward poorer 
members of the population, as do countries where governments are more likely to be held 
accountable for their behavior, as suggested by better measures of voice. Targeting is also 
better in countries where inequality is more pronounced.  
Despite a number of caveats, we find that in comparison to self-selection based on 
consumption, interventions that use means testing, geographic targeting, and self-
selection based on a work requirement are all associated with an increased share of 
benefits going to the bottom two quintiles. Self-selection based on consumption, 4 
demographic targeting to the elderly, and community bidding show limited potential for 
good targeting. Proxy means testing, community-based selection of individuals, and 
demographic targeting to children show good results on average, but with wide variation. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable variation in targeting performance when we examine 
experiences with specific program types and specific targeting methods. Indeed a Theil 
decomposition of the variation in outcome shows that differences between targeting 
methods account for only 20 percent of overall variation; the remainder is due to 
differences found within categories. How well a program implements a chosen targeting 
method is as important as which method is chosen. 
 
2. Data Construction and Description 
Database Construction 
As noted above, while there is a fairly rich literature on targeted programs, much 
of it either documents single programs or compares outcomes within a single region, 
method, or class of intervention. Accordingly, the first step in our analysis was to 
undertake an extensive literature review and then to construct a database of targeted 
antipoverty interventions.
3 
Our criteria for inclusion in this database were the following:  
                                                 
3 This is available in the form of an annotated bibliography, Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002b). For 
each program we obtained details on the study itself (title, authors, reference details, year of publication, 
study objective), background information on the intervention (program name, year implemented, program 
description, type of benefit, program coverage and budget, and transfer levels), targeting method (criteria 
used to determine eligibility and targeting mechanism), how the intervention operated, targeting 
performance (who benefited), and descriptions of impact on welfare and costs of targeting. 5 
•  The intervention is in a low- or middle-income country. 
•  A principal objective of the intervention is poverty reduction defined in terms of 
income or consumption. 
•  Documentation on the intervention contains information on the targeting method 
used, its implementation, and something about outcomes. 
•  The intervention is relatively recent (generally 1985￿2002). 
 
Included in our data are cash transfers (including welfare and social assistance 
payments, child benefits, and noncontributory pensions), near-cash transfers (such as 
quantity rationed subsidized food rations and food stamps), food transfers, universal food 
subsidies, nonfood subsidies, public works, and social funds. 
A number of interventions have objectives that include, but are not limited to, 
direct poverty reduction. Social funds are a good example. While short-term poverty 
reduction can be an important component of these interventions, so too can be the 
construction of physical assets valued by the poor and the development of local capacity 
to design, implement, and maintain infrastructure. The heterogeneity of objectives within 
broadly defined antipoverty interventions means that one must interpret comparisons 
across types of interventions with caution. 
In addition, focusing the review in this way necessarily means excluding a 
number of interventions that may, in some cases, be targeted, and may have some poverty 
reduction impact. Thus, excluded are occupationally based transfer schemes such as 
formal sector unemployment insurance or occupational old age or disability pensions 6 
(because the principal mechanism determining eligibility and benefit levels are 
employment and contributions history rather than current poverty status); credit and 
microcredit schemes (although these are often targeted, they are motivated, in large part, 
by credit market failures); supplementary feeding programs (mainly because our foray 
into the vast literature on this type of intervention did not yield studies that satisfied the 
criteria described above); and most short-term emergency aid (because although this has 
a clear poverty focus, and is often targeted by need, the timescale on which it operates 
typically precludes an assessment of the distribution of the benefits).  
Most studies of targeting￿especially those outside of Latin America and the 
Caribbean￿do not appear in peer-reviewed journals. Consequently, we undertook 
searches of the ￿gray￿ literature using internet search engines found at the World Bank 
and ELDIS and IFPRI websites using the following key words: safety nets, targeting, 
social funds, pensions, public works, subsidies. Additional cases were found via 
canvassing colleagues about work that had not yet been catalogued in these places. 
Searches were also undertaken in the following academic journals for the years 1990￿
2002: Economic Development and Cultural Change, the Journal of Development 
Economics, the Journal of Development Studies, the Journal of Public Economics, the 
World Bank Economic Review, the World Bank Research Observer, and World 
Development; and Economic and Political Weekly for 1998￿2002. Additional cases were 
found through reviews of existing compilations such as Grosh (1994) and Braithwaite, 
Grootaert, and Milanovic (2000). 7 
Given the nature of such a search, it is important to remember that our sample is 
not necessarily reflective of the distribution of all programs, but rather of those that have 
some measurement of targeting outcomes that has been written up in the catalogued 
English-language literature that we had access to. Programs are more likely to be written 
up this way if one or more of the following features apply: 
•  It is from a country with a household survey that measures consumption and 
participation in government programs. 
•  It is in a country with a culture of evaluation as part of decisionmaking. 
•  It receives funding from an international agency that requires measurement of 
outcomes. 
•  It is a program that by virtue of methods or setting is deemed attractive by 
analysts and editors. 
For example, we suspect that programs using community-based methods and 
agents are underrepresented, because they are often only locally funded and more 
commonly are used when there are poor data and low administrative capacity. These 
features reduce the likelihood of an evaluation being done and finding its way into the 
international literature. For similar reasons, it is likely that the literature on public works 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is also underrepresented. Proxy-means tests are, on the other hand, 
well represented, with a large share of all such programs showing up in this sample. 
 8 
Data Description 
Based on the criteria described above, we collected information for 111 
interventions in 47 countries. Table 1 provides a description of the distribution of these 
interventions across regions, income groups, and intervention types. We can see that this 
sample of interventions provides a fairly broad regional coverage. Although cash transfer 
programs account for a large proportion (38 percent) of the interventions, the other 
intervention types are well represented. In some regions, a particular intervention type 
dominates: cash transfers in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and Central 
Asia (ECA), universal food subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and 
near-cash transfers in South Asia (SA). By contrast, there is a wider mix of reported 
interventions in other regions. Most of the cash transfer programs occur in Latin America 
 
Table 1: The distribution of interventions, by region and country income levels 
Transfers Subsidies  Public  works  for   






             
By regions             
 Latin America and Caribbean, 28 12  3  3  0  1  4  5 
 Eastern Europe and FSU, 24 22  1  0  0  0  0  1 
 Middle East and North Africa, 13 0   0 0  13  0 0  0 
 Sub-Saharan Africa, 12 3   0 1 4  1 2  1 
 South Asia, 21 1  13  3  0 0  4  0 
 East Asia, 13 4  1  4  0 2  1  1 
            
By  income  level            
 Poorest, 58 14  15  6  9 2  7  5 
 Less poor, 53 28  3  5  8  2 4  3 
  Total, 111  42  18 11 17  4  11  8 
Notes. 1. Numbers in italics are number of interventions by region and income level. 
2. Poorest countries have per capita GDP in PPP dollars below 1,200; less poor countries have per capita GDP 
above 1,200 and below 10,840. 9 
and the Caribbean (LAC) and ECA, most of the near-cash transfer programs occur in 
South Asia, most of the universal food subsidies occur in MENA, and most of the social 
funds occur in LAC. Dividing the sample by per capita GDP levels, we find that cash 
transfer programs are more likely to be found in less poor countries and near-cash 
transfers in the poorest countries. 
Table 2 provides information on the distribution of interventions and their 
targeting methods. We distinguish between three broad forms of targeting: 
individual/household assessment, categorical, and self-selection and various 
subcategories within each of these. 
Individual/household assessment is a method under which eligibility is directly 
assessed on an individual basis. In a verified means test, (nearly) complete information is 
obtained on household income and/or wealth and compared to other sources of 
information such as pay stubs, or income and property tax records. This requires the 
existence of such verifiable records as well as the administrative capacity to process this 
information and to continually update it in a timely fashion. Absent the capacity for a 
verified means test, other individual assessment mechanisms are used. For example, 
simple means tests, with no independent verification of income, are not uncommon. A 
visit to the household may help verify in a qualitative way that visible standards of living 
(which reflect income or wealth) are more or less consistent with the figures reported. 
Proxy-means tests involve generating a score for applicants based on fairly easy-to-
observe characteristics of the household such as the location and quality of the dwelling, 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of adult members. The indicators used to calculate this score and their weights are 
derived from statistical analysis of data from detailed household surveys. An increasingly 
popular approach to individual assessment has been to decentralize the selection process 
to local communities so that a community leader or group of community members whose 
principal functions in the community are not related to the transfer program will decide 
who in the community should benefit and who should not.  
Categorical targeting￿also referred to as statistical targeting, tagging, or group 
targeting￿involves defining eligibility in terms of individual or household characteristics 
that are considered to be easy to observe, hard to manipulate, and correlated with poverty. 
Age, gender, ethnicity, land ownership, and household demographic composition or 
location, are common examples. Geographic targeting is often used and often in tandem 
with other methods.  
Self-selection. With some interventions, although eligibility is universal, the 
design intentionally involves dimensions that are thought to encourage the poorest to use 
the program and the nonpoor not to do so.
4 This is accomplished by recognizing 
differences in the private participation costs between poor and nonpoor households. For 
example, this may involve (1) the use of low wages on public works schemes so that only 
those with a low opportunity cost of time due to low wages or limited hours of 
employment will present themselves for jobs; (2) the restriction of transfers to take place 
at certain times with a requirement to queue; or (3) or the location of points of service 
                                                 
4 Note that because there are always some actions (and therefore costs) required of beneficiaries to register 
for and collect a benefit, strictly speaking, all programs are self-targeted to some degree. 12 
delivery in areas where the poor are highly concentrated so that the nonpoor have higher 
(private and social) costs of access. An alternative form of self-selection is found in 
social fund-type interventions where communities apply for program funds. Here, 
selection uses differences in the private participation costs between poor and nonpoor 
communities as a way of targeting benefits.
5 
Note that universal food subsidies (with or without quantity rationing) can be 
viewed as a form of self-selection, because they are universally available and households 
receive benefits by deciding to consume the commodity. In practice, households can 
often determine not just whether to participate, but also the intensity of their 
participation. The more income-elastic are expenditures on these items, the more 
effective is the targeting. For example, food transfers often involve commodities with 
￿inferior￿ characteristics (e.g., low quality wheat or rice), and households often substitute 
away from such expenditures as incomes increase.
6 
Table 2 uses this broad taxonomy of targeting methods but also specifies the 
principal approaches taken within the three broad categories of individual assessment, 
categorical targeting, and self-selection. The first thing to notice is that interventions use 
a combination of targeting methods; in all we have 226 occurrences of different targeting 
methods, so that the interventions in our sample use just over two different targeting 
                                                 
5 Social funds also use other mechanisms, such as geographical targeting. Differences in access to 
information or capacity for ￿demanding￿ social funds also account for differential access to these 
interventions. 
6 Alderman and Lindert (1998) provide a recent review of the potential and limitations of self-targeted food 
subsidies. 13 
methods, on average. Just 37 interventions use a single targeting method, while 43 use 
two methods, 21 use three methods, and 10 use four methods. 
There are some marked differences by region. Most of the interventions using 
means and proxy-means testing are concentrated in ECA and LAC. A legacy of the 
central planning era in ECA has been an extensive administrative system that is suited to 
the individual assessment of individual circumstances using some form of means or 
proxy-means testing. This, together with a distribution of income that, at least at the time 
of transition, was relatively equal, has meant that targeting in this region is based either 
on some form of individual assessment or individual characteristic, such as age. Reliance 
on food subsidies explains why self-targeting based on consumption patterns is the 
dominant targeting method in MENA. SEA is notable for its extensive use of geographic 
targeting as well as a relatively high reliance on self-selection based on work or 
consumption. LAC countries also use geographic targeting extensively, but this is more 
often accompanied by either direct individual assessment (i.e., means or proxy-means 
testing) or by targeting children. The small number of documented programs for Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) show more mixed patterns. 
There are also broad differences across income levels. Generally, poorer countries 
tend to rely more on self-selection methods and categorical targeting, whereas forms of 
individual assessment are relatively more common in less poor countries. The one 
exception to these general patterns is categorical targeting by age, which is used 
relatively less frequently in poor countries. 14 
Although certain program types are synonymous with certain targeting methods, 
most use a combination of methods. Public works programs typically use a combination 
of geographic targeting and self-selection based on low wages and a work requirement. In 
practice, however, public works also often require additional rationing of employment 
using categorical targeting if demand exceeds supply at the wage paid. Similarly, social 
funds are partly demand driven and therefore have an element of community self-
selection. Food subsidies are self-targeted based on consumption patterns. Cash transfers 
are most likely to have some form of individual assessment but are also often conditioned 
on other characteristics (such as age in the case of pensions or child benefit). 
 
3. Assessing Targeting Effectiveness 
In this section we describe methodologies used to evaluate the targeting efficiency 
of antipoverty interventions and identify important caveats that must be kept in mind 
when interpreting this indicator. We also provide a brief description of targeting 
outcomes in terms of this indicator. 
 
Methods 
A common approach to evaluate the targeting performance of alternative transfer 
instruments is to compare leakage and undercoverage rates. Leakage is the proportion of 
those reached by the program (i.e., are ￿in￿ denoted by i, as opposed to ￿out of,￿ denoted 






, = ,  
where Nnp,i is the number of nonpoor households in the program and Ni is the total 
number of households in the program. 
Undercoverage is the proportion of poor households who are not included in the 






, = , 
where Np,o is the number of poor households who are left out of the program and Np is the 
total number of poor households. 
There are two obvious criticisms of this approach (Coady and Skoufias 2001). 
First, it ignores the seriousness of the targeting errors, because it does not differentiate 
between the erroneous inclusion of nonpoor households lying just above the poverty line 
and those lying well above the line, and it does not differentiate between the erroneous 
exclusion of poor households just below the poverty line and those well below the 
poverty line. In both cases, the different errors are treated identically. Second, it focuses 
only on who gets the transfers, not on how much households get. Third, when comparing 
across programs, it is often the case that those that do well on undercoverage 
simultaneously score badly on leakage. For example, so-called universal programs would 
be expected to score relatively well on undercoverage but badly on leakage, but the 
leakage/undercoverage approach does not address the issue of trade-off. Much of the 
problem with this approach, therefore, lies in the fact that the relative social valuation of 16 
income transfers to different households (e.g., moderately versus extremely poor) is not 
made explicit, although it is obvious that all poor are treated similarly and all nonpoor are 
also treated similarly, even if the issue of their relative weights is ignored. 
Another commonly used approach to evaluate targeting effectiveness can be 
viewed as an attempt to incorporate the size of transfers and the budget explicitly into the 
analysis as well as how transfer levels are differentiated across households in different 
parts of the income distribution. Rather than asking how effective the program is at 
identifying the poor, it asks how effective it is at reducing poverty. It proceeds by 
comparing the relative impacts of the alternative instruments on the extent of poverty 
subject to a fixed common budget or, equivalently, the minimum cost of achieving a 
given reduction in poverty across instruments (Ravallion and Chao 1989; Ravallion 
1993). 
An alternative performance index is the distributional characteristic more 
commonly used in the literature on commodity taxation (Newbery and Stern 1987; 
















h is the social valuation of income transferred to household h (or its ￿welfare 
weight￿), T
h is the level of the transfer to the household, and θ
h is each household￿s share 
of the total program budget. The attraction of this index is that welfare weights are made 
explicit. For example, if poor households are given a welfare weight of unity and nonpoor 17 
households a weight of zero, and we further assume that all beneficiary households 
receive the same level of transfer, then this index collapses to (1-L), the proportion of 
households receiving transfers that are classified as poor. If, in addition, we know the 
level of benefits received by beneficiaries, then it collapses to the share of the program 
budget received by poor households. Where the ￿poor￿ are defined as households falling 
within the bottom deciles of the national income distribution, similar indices can be 
calculated. Generally, all that is required to calculate the distributional characteristic is 
mean incomes by decile and decile shares in transfers. The administrative cost side of the 
program can also be easily incorporated by including this cost in the denominator along 
with total transfers. 
 
Our Measure of Targeting Effectiveness 
To compare the performance of the different targeting methods used in the range 
of programs considered in our analysis, we need a comparable performance indicator for 
each program. As is always the case is such ￿meta-analyses,￿ the definitions, methods, 
and presentations in the original studies vary in ways that make it difficult to assemble 
such a single summary performance indicator. Incidence and participation rates may be 
reported over the full welfare distribution; for the poorest 10, 20, or 40 percent of the 
population; or for a poor/nonpoor classification that differs by country. Other studies 
report none of these measures, but use other less common ones. And, of course, the 
measure of welfare used is not always strictly comparable from study to study. Thus we 18 
are faced with how best to compare targeting performance outcomes using data that are 
not strictly comparable. 
Most studies catalogued in our database provide information on at least one of the 
following indices: 
•  The proportion of total transfers received by households falling within the bottom 
40, 20, or 10 percent of the national income distribution. 
•  The proportion of beneficiaries falling within the bottom 40, 20, or 10 percent of 
the national income distribution. 
•  The proportion of total transfers or beneficiaries going to poor households, where 
the poor are defined in terms of some specified part of the welfare distribution 
(e.g., falling in the bottom 35 percent of the income distribution). 
As indicated above, ideally we would like to know the proportion of total 
transfers received by households falling within different centiles of the national income 
distribution. This is a better measure than the proportion of beneficiaries by centile, 
because in the case of the latter, we do not necessarily know anything about variations in 
the levels of transfers. These two measures￿proportions of total transfers and 
proportions of beneficiaries￿are only equivalent when transfer levels are uniform across 
beneficiaries. 
Given that no single common measure of targeting performance is available, we 
have constructed a measure based on a comparison of actual performance to a common 
reference outcome, namely, the outcome that would result from neutral (as opposed to 19 
progressive or regressive) targeting. A neutral targeting outcome means that each decile 
receives 10 percent of the transfer budget or that each decile accounts for 10 percent of 
the program beneficiaries. One can think of neutral targeting as arising either from the 
random allocation of benefits across the population or a universal intervention in which 
all individuals received identical benefits. The indicator used in our analysis is 
constructed by dividing the actual outcome by the appropriate neutral outcome. For 
example, if the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution receive 60 percent of the 
benefits, then our indicator of performance is calculated as (60/40) = 1.5; thus a higher 
value is associated with better targeting performance. A value of 1.5 means that targeting 
has led to the target group (here those in the bottom two quintiles) receiving 50 percent 
more than they would have received under a universal intervention. A value greater than 
1 indicates progressive targeting; less than 1, regressive targeting; and unity denotes 
neutral targeting.  
The performance indicator used in the analysis below is based on a lexicographic 
selection process among the available incidence indicators based on the different ￿target 
groups.￿ Where it is available, we base performance on the proportion of benefits 
accruing to the bottom two quintiles. Where this is not available, we base it on the 
proportion of benefits accruing to the bottom quintile, then benefits to the bottom decile, 
and lastly the share of program benefits received by individuals deemed to be below a 
poverty line. We can calculate such a performance indicator for 77 programs. 
 20 
Descriptive Results 
Table 3 lists all programs for which we can construct our performance indicator 
from best to worst. There is enormous variation in targeting performance, ranging from 
4.00 for the Trabajar public works program in Argentina to 0.28 for value added tax 
(VAT) exemptions on fresh milk in South Africa. The median value is 1.25, so that the 
￿typical￿ program transfers 25 percent more to the target group than would be the case 
with a universal (or random) allocation. However, a staggering 21 of the 77 programs￿
more than a quarter￿are regressive, with a performance index less than 1. In these cases, 
a random selection of beneficiaries would actually provide greater benefits to the poor.  
It is instructive to focus on the worst and best 10 programs. The worst have a 
median score of only 0.64, ranging from 0.28 to 0.85. They are mainly from SSA and 
MENA, with three from South Africa￿s VAT exemption program. Seven of the 10 are 
food subsidy programs, and two of the remaining three programs involve cash transfers. 
In fact, median performance rises to 1.35 if interventions using self-selection based on 
consumption are withdrawn from the sample. Doing so also reduces the proportion of 
regressive interventions to 16 percent. It is also noticeable that only one of the poorly 
performing programs uses either means or proxy-means targeting methods, none of them 
are geographically targeted, and they come from across the income spectrum. The top 10 
programs have a median score of 2.1, ranging from 1.95 to 4.0. They are from either 
LAC or ECA. Seven involve cash transfers. Nine make use of means, proxy-means, or 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The fact that cash transfers feature in both the best and worst programs highlights 
the possibility that variations in targeting performance may reflect poor implementation 
rather than poor potential for such programs. It is, however, noticeable that whereas 
public works are all in the top half of the performance table, social funds are nearly all in 
the bottom half. This is consistent with there being a trade-off between the objective of 
reducing current poverty (through public-works wage transfers) and the objective of 
reducing future poverty through developmental public investments (through the assets 
created by social fund programs). Also, the dominance of less-poor countries among the 
top half of the table suggests that characteristics correlated with income, such as 
administrative capacity, are important determinants of targeting performance. 
Table 4 develops this idea further by providing summary statistics on targeting 
performance￿sample size, median, interquartile range (iqr) and the iqr as a percentage 
of the median￿by targeting method. First impressions suggest that Table 4 yields a clear 
hierarchy in terms of targeting performance. Interventions using forms of individual 
assessment have better incidence than those relying on forms of categorical targeting, 
which in turn outperform interventions that use self-selection, much as one would expect. 
A closer inspection, however, reveals that such impressions are too general to be very 
useful. First, there is much heterogeneity within these broad methods of targeting. Most 
notably, the category of self-selection includes interventions utilizing a work requirement 
that have the highest median performance and self-selection based on consumption, 
which has the lowest median. Second, three specific methods￿categorical targeting to 
the elderly, self-selection based on consumption, and community bidding for 24 
interventions￿have lower median values than other interventions and relatively low 
variations in these values as measured by the iqr as a percentage of the median. This 
suggests that, all things being equal, even the best examples of these targeting methods 
produce relatively small targeting gains. By contrast, while other methods report higher 
median values, they are also characterized by proportionately higher variations in 
targeting effectiveness. So while these methods offer potentially large gains, there is no 
guarantee that they will improve targeting performance. 
 
Table 4: Targeting performance, by targeting method 










        
All methods  77  1.25  0.56  44.8 
        
Any form of individual assessment  30  1.40  0.73  52.1 
 Means testing  20  1.35  0.61  45.2 
 Proxy means testing  6  1.44  0.58  40.3 
 Community assessment  6  1.40  0.78  55.7 
        
Any categorical method  53  1.32  0.50  37.9 
 Geographic  31  1.33  0.51  38.3 
 Age ￿ elderly  10  1.08  0.40  37.0 
 Age ￿ young  22  1.45  0.60  41.4 
 Other categorical  18  1.40  0.79  56.4 
        
Any selection method  36  1.10  0.38  34.5 
 Work  4  1.85  1.34  72.4 
 Consumption  25  1.00  0.35  35.0 
 Community bidding  7  1.10  0.22  20.0 
 
One way to explore the source of variation in targeting outcomes is by using a 
Theil inequality index. A desirable feature of the Theil index is that it is subgroup-
decomposable; by grouping data by some characteristic, we can allocate variation in 25 
targeting across these programs into two categories: variations within and variations 
across groups. When programs are grouped by region, we find that variation in average 
performance across continents explains only about 28 percent of total variation. Grouping 
according to program type, we find that variation in average performance between 
programs explains 36 percent of the total variation. Grouping by targeting method 
(according to whether they use geographic, means/proxy means, both, or other targeting 
methods) explains only 20 percent of the total variation.  
One way of interpreting these large variations is in terms of implementation 
effectiveness. No matter how well one chooses among methods or programs, 
effectiveness of implementation is a key factor in determining targeting performance. 
This point is further illustrated by noting that raising the performance of all programs 
with the same targeting method and with performance below the method median to the 
median for that method increases the average targeting performance from 1.35 to 1.49, a 
return of 14 percentage points.  
 
Caveats and Limitations 
There are a number of caveats and limitations that should be made explicit with 
regard to interpreting our performance measure and, thus, the analysis based on it. First, 
our performance measure is a mishmash of various measures, as discussed above, 
although for the vast majority of the interventions (80 percent), we use the percentage of 
benefits accruing to either the bottom 40 percent or 20 percent of the national income 
distribution. This raises concerns regarding comparability. For example, one may believe 26 
it is more difficult to target the poorest 20 percent compared to the poorest 40 percent, so 
that programs for which we use the former may appear ineffective solely because of the 
performance indicator used. We have addressed this issue in a number of ways. We 
calculated a second performance measure that gives, through its lexicographic ordering, 
priority to the proportion of resources flowing to the bottom decile, then bottom quintile, 
then bottom two quintiles. Doing so does not change in any meaningful way the results 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. We also ran all regressions (reported below) using both 
measures of targeting performance. Again, there was no meaningful change to our 
results. This is not completely surprising, given that our performance measure and the 
alternative have correlation coefficients (in terms of levels and ranks, respectively) 
between 0.94 and 0.97. As a further check, in the multivariate regression analysis, we 
always include variables that control for the performance measure used. 
Second, by focusing on the percentage of benefits accruing to the bottom of the 
income distribution, we are obviously ignoring where in the remaining parts of the 
distribution the leaked benefits are going. For example, finding that a program is very 
ineffectively targeted at the bottom 20 percent is less worrying if the leaked benefits 
accrue mostly to those just above this income cutoff. This is partly why we give priority 
to the 40 percent measure of performance when constructing our performance index. It is 
also arguably the case that such a focus coincides more closely to the objectives of most 
targeted programs. In any case, the fact that our results are extremely insensitive to the 
ordering is at least suggestive that where between 20 percent and 40 percent one draws 
the cutoff is somewhat inconsequential. 27 
Third, recall that the data we have collated are only a sample of hundreds of 
antipoverty interventions. Further, we could only calculate our performance indicator for 
two-thirds of this sample. These observations when taken together point to the possibility 
of ￿sample selection bias,￿ that is, there may be certain characteristics of these 
programs￿for example, that they were evaluated and documented￿which are 
themselves associated with our measures of targeting performance. A good example of 
this possibility relates to community targeting. Our sample is only a fraction of the 
studies listed in Conning and Kevane (2001); it could well be that only successful 
interventions using community targeting have been well documented. 
Fourth, some of the mistargeting observed here arises because households that 
were poor when the program admission decision was made were better-off at the time of 
assessment or vice versa. This has implications for the design of targeted interventions. 
Methods that rely on static indicators of living standards (such as proxy-means tests) are 
likely to perform less well than those that rely on self-selection when there is 
considerable movement of households in and out of poverty. 
We remind the reader that we have been able to focus on only one narrow piece of 
the targeting and program choice decisions. Our performance index focuses solely on the 
benefit side of the equation and ignores cost, and the latter may be an extremely 
important factor in choosing targeting methods or programs to transfer income to the 
poor. For example, it is often argued that well-designed public works programs can be 
very effective at concentrating benefits in the hands of the poor. However, the high 
nontransfer costs associated with such programs (including nonwage costs and forgone 28 
income) substantially reduce the cost effectiveness of such transfer programs in this 
regard. Our ignoring the cost side largely reflects data restrictions. In conducting the 
literature review, we collated the available evidence on administrative costs, hoping to 
comment on how these varied by method. Unfortunately, such data were scant. We have 
some sort of cost data for 32 programs, but both cost and our performance indicator for 
only 20. Moreover, the cost data suffer from a severe lack of comparability. Most of the 
data for Latin America are taken from Grosh (1994) and give administrative costs as a 
share of the program budget. These numbers were based on budget or expenditure 
records for program administration and thus include only official costs. No attempt is 
made to determine how much of program benefits are siphoned off due to corruption or 
theft. In contrast, much of the cost data on South Asian programs is constructed from 
knowing a total budget and having data from a survey sample on the value of benefit 
received by households. Through appropriate extrapolation, a figure for the total cost per 
dollar of benefit received is calculated. In most cases, it appears that corruption and theft 
contribute more to total program expenses than legitimate administrative expenses, 
though little is said about the latter. In any case, even when cost data are available, 
focusing on benefit incidence is extremely important in its own right. 
It is worth reemphasizing that the objective of effectively targeting transfers, 
while always important, is often only one of the objectives. Therefore, the extent to 
which there are trade-offs between these other objectives and that of effective targeting 
needs to be taken into account when evaluating any program. However, it may be the 
case that these other objectives impinge as much, if not more so, on the program design, 29 
the targeting process, and the way in which the program is ￿sold￿ and delivered. 
Presumably, most policy analysts would at least accept the idea that monitoring the 
targeting performance of programs dedicated mainly to poverty alleviation is always 
desirable, especially in the context of developing countries where poverty is high, 
budgets are tight, and other policy instruments are less developed, less sophisticated, and 
less progressive. 
 
4. Regression Analysis 
Although factors other than choice of method or program may be relatively large, 
this does not mean that these choices are unimportant. To get an idea of the importance of 
these choices, Table 5 presents the results of a series of regressions that identify how 
performance varies systematically across these choices. In doing so, we note that 
targeting methods are themselves choices; they are not exogenous or predetermined. 
Consequently, it is incorrect to treat these results as causal relations. Rather, they are 
measures of partial correlation or association. 
Our first specification explores how these choices are associated with (log) 
incidence. We include dummy variables for nine targeting methods described above: 
three forms of individual assessment (means testing, proxy-means testing, community 
selection of individual beneficiaries), four forms of categorical targeting (geographic, the 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bidding for projects). The omitted category is self-selection based on consumption. We 
chose this as the base category for two reasons. It is often argued that this form of 
targeting should be seen as a transition tool while the capacity for more precise 
mechanisms￿such as means testing￿is developed.
7 Conversely, others have expressed 
skepticism over the ability of alternative targeting methods to reach the poor when 
compared to self-selection based on the consumption of food.
8 Hence, an attractive 
feature of this specification is that one should interpret the coefficients on these methods 
relative to self-selection based on consumption. We also include, but do not report, 
controls indicating whether the performance measure is based on the proportion of 
benefits going to the bottom quintile, the poorest decile, the poor defined with reference 
to a poverty line, or the proportion of poor found in population. Doing so takes into 
account confounding effects arising from the use of different measures of incidence in the 
studies on which this analysis is based. Standard errors are computed using the methods 
proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980). 
Specification (1) shows that means testing, geographic targeting, and self-
selection based on a work requirement are all associated with an increased share of 
program resources going to the poorest two quintiles relative to self-selection based on 
consumption. Proxy-means testing, community assessment, and targeting the young are 
also associated with improved incidence, though these are measured with larger standard 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Pinstrup-Andersen (1988) and Alderman and Lindert (1998). 
8 Such implicit concern is found, for example, in Cornia and Stewart (1995). 32 
errors. Targeting the elderly, other types of categorical targeting, and selection based on 
community bidding are not associated with better incidence relative to our base category. 
Countries with better capacity for program implementation may do better at 
directing benefits toward poorer members of the population either by choosing finer 
targeting methods or implementing their choices more effectively. As such, the 
associations in specification (1) may be misleading; they may merely reflect correlation 
between unobserved implementation capacity and observed targeting methods. We 
explore this possibility in specifications (2), (3), and (4).  
In specification (2) we include log GDP per capita (in PPP dollars) as of 1995 as 
an additional regressor. The hypothesis is that as a country becomes wealthier, it acquires 
the institutional capacity needed to design a well-targeted intervention. The positive and 
significant coefficient on income is consistent with such an argument. While the 
inclusion of income does not appear to reduce the coefficients on means testing or 
geographical targeting, coefficients on proxy-means testing, community assessment, and 
targeting the young effectively fall to zero and remain imprecisely measured. Selection 
based on a work requirement is still associated with improved incidence relative to 
selection based on consumption, but the coefficient is considerably smaller.  
Specification (3) explores further the issue of implementation capacity by 
including measures of voice and governance found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999). Compiling subjective perceptions regarding the quality of governance in 
different countries using sources such as polls of experts, commercial risk rating 
agencies, and cross-country surveys, they define voice, perhaps more accurately 33 
described as ￿voice and accountability,￿ as a composite measure based on aspects of 
political processes, civil liberties, and political rights, and thus captures the extent to 
which citizens participate in the selection of their governments as well as the extent to 
which citizens and media can hold governments accountable for their actions. 
Government effectiveness combines perceptions of the quality of public service 
provision, the competence of civil servants, and the credibility of governments￿ 
commitment to policies. We use countries￿ percentile ranks (their ranking relative to each 
other), as these provide an easier way of interpreting the estimated coefficients. At 6, Viet 
Nam has the lowest percentile rank for ￿voice￿ while Costa Rica has the highest 
percentile rank, 88. Uzbekistan obtains the poorest governance rank at 6; Chile, the 
highest rank at 86. In addition, we include country-specific Gini coefficients on the 
grounds that because targeting requires variation across individuals, it is plausible that 
identifying potential beneficiaries is easier when differences across individuals are 
greater. 
Controlling for governance, voice, and inequality does not appear to eliminate the 
positive association￿relative to self-selection based on consumption￿between means 
testing, geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement and 
targeting performance. Targeting performance is better in countries with higher levels of 
inequality and where governments are held accountable for their actions. Conditional on 
country income, better governance does not improve targeting, but these latter two 
variables are highly correlated. When we drop log income in specification (4), we find 
that targeting is better in countries with better governance and voice. To give a sense of 34 
the magnitude of these effects, raising governance rank from 30 (the rank reported for 
Nicaragua) to 73 (the rank reported for Costa Rica) would be associated with an 
improvement in targeting performance of 0.29, or about a 30 percent improvement 
relative to neutral targeting. Raising the voice rank from 37 (Pakistan￿s voice rank) to 67 
(India￿s voice rank) would be associated with a similar improvement in targeting 
performance.
 9  
We performed three additional specific checks to investigate the robustness of this 
result. Specifications (5), (6), and (7) use the same set of controls as specification (4) but 
restrict the data by the manner in which the performance indicator is measured. 
Specification (5) only includes studies that report the share of benefits accruing to the 
bottom two quintiles. Specification (6) includes studies that report the share of benefits 
accruing to the bottom two quintiles, or if that datum is not available, the share of 
benefits going to the poorest quintile. Specification (7) includes studies that report the 
share of benefits accruing either to the bottom two quintiles, the poorest quintile, or the 
poorest decile. Where more than one measure is available, we use the measure relating to 
the larger number of individuals (so if shares going to the bottom 20 percent and 40 
percent are both available, we use shares going to the bottom 40 percent). As we expand 
the sample in this way, the coefficient on geographic targeting increases, the coefficient 
on targeting based on a work requirement falls, and the coefficient on means testing stays 
                                                 
9 Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) caution that these composite measures are likely to be 
measured with error. As such, they are likely to provide lower-bound estimates of the impact of these 
characteristics. 35 
about the same, but all three are positive and significant. Across specifications (2) 
through (7), means testing is associated with improvements in targeting performance, 
relative to self-selection based on consumption, of 21 to 27 percent. Geographic testing 
and self-selection based on a work requirement improve targeting by 20 to 36 percent. By 
contrast, when we only look at studies reporting shares going to the bottom two quintiles, 
the coefficient on targeting the elderly, while negative, is not statistically significant, 
whereas targeting children is associated with an improvement in targeting performance. 
However, the magnitude and precision of these two coefficients does appear sensitive to 
the construction of the dependent variable. As we widen the sample, the negative impact 
of targeting the elderly increases in magnitude (and becomes more precisely measured), 
while the positive coefficient on targeting to young children disappears. 
Specification (8) uses the same sample and regressors as specification (4), but the 
dependent variable is expressed in levels instead of logs. Our basic results remain 
unchanged: means testing and geographic targeting raise targeting performance relative 
to self-selection based on consumption. The coefficient on targeting based on a work 
requirement rises markedly, but is less precisely measured, and there is no meaningful 
change in any of our other results. 
Specification (9) takes a slightly different approach, estimating median 
regressions, which express differences in performance in terms of differences in 36 
medians.
10 This is an attractive check on robustness, because the median is considerably 
less sensitive to outliers, an especially important consideration when working with small 
sample sizes. Relative to specification (4)￿which uses an identical set of regressors, 
sample, and dependent variable￿the median regression reports larger coefficients on 
means testing and geographic targeting, a larger (though less precisely measured) 
coefficient on targeting via a work requirement, and a negative coefficient on targeting 
the elderly. The only change is that targeting to the young is now associated with 
improved targeting performance. 
Our discussion has focused largely on the association between different targeting 
methods and targeting performance relative to self-selection based on consumption and 
conditioning on country characteristics. We have not explored the association between 
combinations of targeting methods and targeting performance, despite the fact that use of 
multiple methods is common. Table 6 remedies this omission. In addition to controls for 
income, voice, governance, inequality, and how the performance measure is constructed, 
we include in specification (1) the number of targeting methods used. The results show 
that use of more methods is associated with improved targeting; each additional method 
improves performance by 18 percent. In specification (2), we represent the number of 
targeting methods by a series of dummy variables. This produces a similar finding. 
Unfortunately, our sample size is too small to explore the association between specific 
                                                 
10 More precisely, we estimated a quantile regression centered at the median with standard errors obtained 
via bootstrap resampling with 50 repetitions to correct for heteroscedasticity. Increasing the number of 
repetitions does not appreciably alter the standard errors. 37 
groupings of methods and targeting performance, but these results suggest that such an 
approach improves targeting. 
 
Table 6: Association between targeting performance and number of methods used 
  (1) (2) 
Number of methods used  0.137   
 (3.38)**   
Used two methods    0.110 
   (1.12) 
Used three methods    0.293 
   (2.89)** 
Used four methods    0.372 
   (3.01)** 
Log GDP per capita  0.189  0.185 
 (2.75)**  (2.65)** 
Voice 0.005  0.005 
 (2.93)**  (2.66)** 
Governance -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.65)  (0.62) 
Inequality 0.013  0.013 
 (2.98)**  (2.82)** 
    
F statistic  6.03**  5.02** 
R2 0.506  0.508 
Sample size  76  76 
Notes: 1. Specifications (1) and (2) contain controls, not reported, indicating whether performance measure 
is based on proportion of benefits going to the (a) bottom quintile, (b) poorest decile, (c) to the 
￿poor,￿ or (d) proportion of poor found in population. 
2. Specifications (1) and (2) estimate standard errors using the methods proposed by Huber (1967) 
and White (1980). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the contested issue of the efficacy of targeting interventions 
in developing countries using a newly constructed database of 111 targeted antipoverty 
interventions found in 47 countries. We use these data to address three questions: (1) 
What targeting outcomes are observed? (2) Are there systematic differences in targeting 38 
performance by method and other factors? (3) What are the implications for such 
systematic differences for the design and implementation of targeted interventions? 
We find that the median value of our measure of targeting performance is 1.25, so 
that the median program transfers 25 percent more to the target group than would be the 
case with a universal (or random) allocation. In this sense, ￿targeting works.￿ However, a 
staggering 21 of the 77 programs for which we can build our performance measure￿
more than a quarter￿are regressive, with a performance index less than 1. In these cases, 
a random selection of beneficiaries would actually provide greater benefits to the poor. 
Some of this regressivity is driven by the inclusion of food subsidy interventions that use 
self-selection based on consumption as a targeting method. However, even when these 
are dropped from our sample, we still find that 16 percent of targeted antipoverty 
interventions are regressive. 
Countries with better capacity for program implementation, as measured either by 
GDP per capita or indicators of ￿governance,￿ do better at directing benefits toward 
poorer members of the population. Countries where governments are more likely to be 
held accountable for their behavior￿where ￿voice￿ is stronger￿also appear to 
implement interventions with improved targeting performance. Targeting is also better in 
countries where inequality is more pronounced and presumably differences in economic 
well-being are easier to identify. 
Mindful of the caveats enumerated in Section 3, interventions that use means 
testing, geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement are all 
associated with an increased share of benefits going to the bottom two quintiles relative 39 
to self-selection based on consumption. Demographic targeting to the elderly, community 
bidding, and self-selection based on consumption show limited potential for good 
targeting. Proxy-means testing, community-based selection of individuals, and 
demographic targeting to children show good results, on average, but with considerable 
variation. That said, we again emphasize that there is considerable variation in targeting 
performance when we examine experiences with specific program types and specific 
targeting methods. Indeed a Theil decomposition of the variation in outcome shows that 
differences between targeting methods account for only 20 percent of overall variation; 
the remainder is due to differences found within categories. Thus it is not surprising that 
while community assessment generally performs no better relative to self-targeting based 
on consumption, Alderman￿s (2002) study of community targeting in Albania describes a 
highly successful example of this form of targeting. Similarly, Case and Deaton (1998) 
and Duflo (2000) show that in South Africa, targeting the elderly is an effective method 
for reaching poor children, even though as we have shown here, targeting the elderly 
generally performs relatively poorly when compared to other methods for reaching the 
poor.  
Thus, while the patterns observed are instructive, they should not be interpreted as 
a lexicographic ranking of methods. Differences in individual country characteristics and 
implementation are also important determinants of outcomes and must be considered 
carefully in making appropriate targeting decisions. This suggests that further work on 
targeting should extend beyond simple quantitative comparisons of methods to consider 
more detailed and often qualitative issues of comparisons within methods￿how does 40 
(and how should) implementation differ in different settings and how can constraints of 
political economy, poor information, or low administrative capacity best be 
accommodated or reduced? In a companion paper, Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002a) 
provide a more detailed discussion of the merits and limitations of individual targeting 
methods in an attempt to move in this direction. 
 41 
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